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This article considers three different historical events from the point of view of their 
connections to aspects of the history of liberal political reason:  the actions of the 
British in New South Wales in the early 19th century in their claim to sovereignty over 
Indigenous lands; the establishment of Aboriginal missions and subsequent removal 
of Aboriginal children in the early 20th century; and the Northern Territory Emergency 
Response and suspension of the Australian Commonwealth Racial Discrimination Act 
(1975) early in the 21st century. The aim is to point to gaps between present claims 
about liberalism and ‘actual existing liberalism’, review the basis for examining 
accounts of governance deploying ‘authoritarian liberalism’ and ‘race war’ as central 




In June 2007 the Australian Government announced the Northern Territory 
Emergency Response, within days of a public report raising issues of sexual abuse of 
children in Aboriginal communities in the Territory.1 The intervention was 
announced in the lead-up to a Federal election and comprised widespread restriction 
of alcohol, compulsory medical checks of Indigenous children, the quarantining of 
income support for basics like food, enforced school attendance, and the abolition of 
the permit system on Aboriginal lands. It was accompanied by the arrival of doctors, 
                                                 
1
 R. Wild and P. Anderson, Ampe akelyernemane meke mekarle. Little children are sacred. Report of 
the Northern Territory Board of Inquiry into the Protection of Aboriginal Children from Sexual Abuse, 
2007.    
This article contains aspects of the history of many Indigenous men and women who were affected by 
government policies in Australia. The article could not have been written without recognising their 
involvement and existence. In some Aboriginal communities, seeing the names of dead people may 
cause sadness and distress, particularly to relatives of those people. Aboriginal people are warned 
that names of dead people may appear in this article. The author wishes to thank Gary Wickham, 
Karen Jackson and four anonymous reviewers for valuable comments on earlier drafts of the article. 
 2 
police and army personnel. The intervention was at odds with the recommendations 
of the Wild and Anderson report itself, which emphasised the fact that while the 
report arose in part from allegations of child sexual abuse, this was largely a 
symptom of ‘a breakdown of Aboriginal culture and society’. 2  It was claims of child 
sexual abuse that provided the main impetus and political rationale for the 
intervention, which included the suspension of the Commonwealth Racial 
Discrimination Act (1975) to enforce, among other things, income quarantining and 
the taking of lands. Suspension of the RDA was an attempt to force Aboriginal people 
to live in areas approved by the Government, through the removal of social security 
benefits where a child is considered to be in need of protection, or where the 
parents reside in specific areas, or where a child has an unsatisfactory attendance at 
school.  Suspension of the Act was accompanied by the acquisition of Aboriginal 
lands by means of compulsory leases, the abandonment of the Community 
Development Employment Program,3 and preventing a court from observing 
customary law and practices in sentencing offenders. As a submission to the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination stated: 
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  ‘Most Aboriginal people are willing and committed to solving problems and helping their children. 
They are also eager to better educate themselves…Aboriginal people are not the only victims and not 
the only perpetrators of sexual abuse…Much of the violence and sexual abuse occurring in Territory 
communities is a reflection of past, current and continuing social problems which have developed 
over many decades…The combined effects of poor health, alcohol and drug abuse, unemployment, 
gambling, pornography, poor education and housing, and a general loss of identity and control have 
contributed to violence and to sexual abuse in many forms…Existing government programs to help 
Aboriginal people break the cycle of poverty and violence need to work better. There is not enough 
coordination and communication between government departments and agencies, and this is causing 
a breakdown in services and poor crisis intervention. Improvements in health and social services are 
desperately needed…Programs need to have enough funds and resources and be a long-term 
commitment…Our appointment and terms of reference arose out of allegations of sexual abuse of 
Aboriginal children. Everything we have learned since convinces us that these are just symptoms of a 
breakdown of Aboriginal culture and society. There is, in our view, little point in an exercise of band-
aiding individual and specific problems as each one achieves an appropriate degree of media and 
political hype. It has not worked in the past and will not work in the future...What is required is a 
determined, coordinated effort to break the cycle and provide the necessary strength, power and 
appropriate support and services to local communities, so they can lead themselves out of the 
malaise: in a word, empowerment!’ Wild and Anderson (2007), op. cit., p.12 (emphasis in original). 
3
 According to the  Commonwealth Government , ‘the Community Development Employment Projects 
(CDEP) program strengthens Indigenous communities and supports Indigenous people in remote 
areas through community development and participation opportunities that develop skills, improve 
capacity, work readiness and employability and link with local priorities’. Australian Government, 
Centrelink, at http://www.centrelink.gov.au/internet/internet.nsf/services/cdep.htm, accessed 17 
May 2011. 
 3 
The legislation was based upon a nuclear family assumption, which has little 
or no relevance to many Aboriginal communities.  It also ignored the fact that 
through years of neglect of basic services to Aboriginal communities, many 
children would be living in situations where the provision of education 
services is inadequate and unattractive.4  
 
    With the defeat of the conservative Coalition Government, the new Labor 
government appointed a panel of experts to review the intervention, which in turn 
recommended the reinstatement of the Racial Discrimination Act and changing the 
compulsory income management to voluntary income management. Instead, the 
Government claimed to have carried out extensive consultations of its own across 73 
communities, and in 2010 re-introduced an amended Racial Discrimination Act to 
maintain compulsory income management while at the same time extending it to 
include targeted non-Indigenous welfare recipients throughout Australia. Many 
Indigenous communities disputed the Government’s claim that it acted in 
accordance with their wishes. At the time of writing, Indigenous leaders continue to 
challenge the Government’s claim to have consulted with affected communities.5  
 
    This article  considers three different kinds of events in Australian legal history and 
the history of European-Indigenous relations, drawn from three different parts of 
the country, from the point of view of their connections to aspects of the history of 
liberal political reason: the actions of the British in the early period of white 
settlement in New South Wales in their claim to sovereignty over Indigenous lands; 
the establishment of Aboriginal missions in the early 19th century and the 
subsequent forced removal of Aboriginal children; and the recent Northern Territory 
Emergency Response. The article examines how it may be possible to map these 
events, in the colonial period and in its wake, onto a history of liberal practices of 
governing Aborigines. A conceptual framework to examine this series of powerful 
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events includes notions of authoritarian liberalism and ‘race’ war, where power is 
understood to refer to the way in which relations of force are deployed and given 
concrete expression -  that is, the way in which power ‘…is war, a war continued by 
other means’.6 Such a framework presupposes that the art of liberal forms of 
government, with its injunction to govern through freedom, will attempt to protect 
individual liberty through such mechanisms as representative government and the 
rule of law, but also will attempt to specify the content of individual freedom and 
turn it to various goals. In some cases it will seek to enforce obligations amongst 
those parts of the population considered to be incapable of governing themselves. 
Such a framework aims to explore a somewhat unsettled opposition between power 
and domination on the one hand, and individual freedom on the other.7  
 
LIBERAL FORMS OF GOVERNING INDIGENOUS PEOPLE 
The historian Henry Reynolds described the Northern Territory intervention as an act 
of power which showed the world that the Australian government can interfere with 
the smallest details of domestic life in a blatantly discriminatory way, ‘regardless of  
the country’s international obligations and professed belief in racial equality’.8 
Australia is a long-standing signatory to the UN Covenant on Human Rights and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.9 Although the previous Howard Government 
opposed signing it, Australia has now also endorsed the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which among others acknowledges rights to 
fundamental freedoms, self-determination, and freedom from any kind of 
discrimination.10 These affirmations of liberal democratic rights and equality before 
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 M. Foucault, The birth of biopolitics: lectures at the College de France, 1978-1979 (2008) ed. A. 
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 M.Dean, ‘Liberal government and authoritarianism’ (2002) 31 Economy and society 1, 37-61 
8
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the law are commonly contrasted with government actions, most recently for 
example, Australia’s policies on asylum seekers, its conduct of certain investigations 
under the Commonwealth Anti-Terrorism Act (2005), and the NT intervention. 
Historical investigation of the ‘liberal promise’ of Indigenous rights will often 
acknowledge attempts to extend formal equality to Aboriginal peoples while at the 
same time recognising the limits of this promise and the failure of rights discourse to 
achieve civil and economic rights.11  
 
    Of course, it is one thing to commit to the liberal principle of equal worth of all 
individuals. It is quite another to equate the liberalism in academic political theory 
with liberalism as a ‘powerful historical phenomenon’.12 So while theoretical 
versions of liberalism may be wedded to claims about individual freedoms and equal 
worth, these claims do not necessarily reflect ‘actually existing liberalism’, such as 
the versions of liberal rule under British imperialism and other versions of 
‘authoritarian liberalism’.13 For example, claims concerning freedom under liberalism 
are often qualified by the claim that such freedom is not possessed at birth but is 
acquired through discipline and moral progress, and that liberal government might 
sometimes aim to assist in the moral development of members of subject 
populations.14 Further, this historical argument might also entail a coming-to-terms 
with a Euro-centric ‘developmental view of humanity’ and acknowledgement by 
such nineteenth century liberal theorists as JS Mill or Alex de Tocqueville that non-
Western peoples were ‘not yet ready for self-government’.15 The developmental 
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story among educated Europeans comprised the view that humanity was divided 
into societies and that these could be ranked along a development spectrum, with 
Western Europe at the top. In addition, among these ‘more advanced’ societies, 
some people – the educated and prosperous minority – have advanced further than 
the rest.16 If this meaning of liberalism is applied to the present Australian 
government’s relations with Indigenous Australians, the NT intervention displays not 
so much a contradiction of liberal political reason, or a cynical disregard for 
individual worth, or an mistaken exercise of the rule of law, but rather an historical 
instance of authoritarian liberalism in relation to the governance of peoples who, for 
these purposes, are regarded as either ‘not yet ready for self-government’, or as 
having ‘failed’ at self-government.17 
         
    There are a number of ways in which authoritarian forms of government can be 
seen as a characteristic feature of the history of liberal political reason. Here, 
liberalism is understood as a distinct form of political reason that is concerned with 
the practical implications of the belief that members of the population are endowed 
with, or capable of acquiring a capacity for autonomous, self-directing activity. 
Liberalism understands the social milieu as involving both government regulation 
and also the self-regulating activity of free interactions between individuals capable 
of agency.18 Government may make use of this freedom and has tended to focus on 
the ways in which individual liberty may be recruited for governmental purposes. But 
how has liberal political reason dealt with those in whom the capacity for self-
government is thought to be insufficiently developed?  Hindess points to John 
Locke’s discussion of what should be done about the native inhabitants of North 
America, which suggested that some people are so far from acquiring the capacity 
for self-government that they ‘…should simply be cleared out of the way’.19 For a 
second group, the capacities for self-government may be developed but only 
through the compulsory imposition of extended periods of discipline, a view most 
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influential in the history of authoritarian versions of the welfare state and in the 
history of colonial administration. A third group might be seen as lacking the 
capacities required for autonomous action for ‘external reasons’, such as ill-health, 
poverty or lack of education, and that the role of government should be to build up 
these capacities by establishing a supportive environment. Hindess suggests that in 
western societies before the middle of the 20th century the vast majority of people 
were thought to belong to the second category:  
the category of those who would benefit from being subjected to authoritarian 
rule: the subject peoples of Western imperial rule and, throughout the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, substantial groups in Western societies 
themselves.  In spite of liberalism’s undoubted commitment to liberty, only a 
minority were actually governed as free individuals.  Another minority – whose 
size is, for obvious reasons, difficult to estimate - consisted of those who were 
more or less successfully cleared out of the way.20     
 
    Reynolds’ treatment of Aboriginal sovereignty, particularly his Aboriginal 
Sovereignty: Reflections on Race, State, and Nation has attracted historiographical 
commentary from a number of sources that seek to debunk the assumptions 
underpinning particular kinds of critiques of settler sovereignty.21 For example, Ian 
Hunter argues that many of the critiques contained in Indigenous-rights 
historiography in the genre of the ‘history of the moral nation’ embody the principle 
that, in its origins, the nation failed to produce a just outcome and that the injustice 
of this act can be objectively judged in accordance with a moral-juridical principle 
common to both modern Australians and their colonising forebears.22  Moreover, an 
alternative revisionist view of the culture of the common law is linked to this ‘moral 
history of the nation’ perspective through its shared commitment to ‘presentism’ – 
the view that past actors were governed by the same norms and purposes as their 
present counterparts - which permits the law to function as the trans-historical 
frame against which the moral history of the nation can be judged. Hunter shows 
                                                 
20
 Hindess (2001) 101 
21
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how these assumptions permeate recent history writing of the British occupation 
and the functioning of legal reasoning within it.  
 
    The events discussed in this paper also allow for some examination of the place of 
law in ‘actual existing liberalism’; however, the paper rejects a view of liberal 
political reason as containing fundamental moral principles that carry through the 
period since British occupation.  In addition, these powerful events are understood 
to not follow a continuous advance of ideas and practices over these two centuries 
according to some essential governing principle, or towards some final point of 
arrival, or according to a supra-moral regime spanning the history of the nation.  
Rather, they point to a set of contingent practices relating to specific problems of 
governing specific populations and the conditions under which these problems 
appear, from a liberal understanding of the task of government. The three sets of 
events need to be understood as demonstrating modes of governance that accord 
with liberal political reason, along with an increased rebalancing of law with 
discipline, regulation and normalisation.23      
 
    Some sociologists have argued that positing Australia as an advanced liberal state 
would only be possible by ignoring the ‘profoundly illiberal manner’ in which 
indigenous Australians have been governed, such as nineteenth century protection 
and assimilation policies, forced dispossession, child removal, segregation and denial 
of land tenure, or by overlooking complex hybrid links to other mentalities of 
governing, such as neo-conservatism.24 But as the elements of authoritarian 
liberalism listed above suggest, liberal political reason may not necessarily 
demonstrate an observance of forms of rule such as autonomous citizenship. In 
studies based on the idea of a liberal mode of governing, autonomous individuals 
and individual liberty should be seen as a governmental product – the effect of 
interventions concerned to promote a specific ‘form of life’. Hindess suggests that 
different conceptions of liberalism derive from a fundamental ambiguity in the 
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liberal project.  In the discourse of liberal politics, the figure of a community of 
autonomous individuals appears as a given reality, serving to identify the character 
and limits of legitimate government, while at the same time it may appear as a ‘yet 
to be realised positivity, serving to define the objective for a variety of governmental 
projects’.25  
 
    It is in these senses that any opposition between liberal and authoritarian 
rationalities of governing is regarded as highly unstable.26 This is particularly the case 
when legal powers protecting liberal freedoms are given normative content by 
specialist knowledges in the formally non-political domains of civil society. As Dean 
explains, the liberal project of ‘governing through freedom’ entails divisions between 
and within populations in such a way as to require authoritarian or despotic forms of 
governing.  So liberal government encompasses a defined legal-political order as well 
as a ‘liberal police’, a feature of liberalism that has long been noted by such 
intellectual stances as post-colonialism, feminism and the governmentality 
literatures.  It is by examining this liberal police that we come to understand the 
substantive content of the self-governing individual and its ‘others’, which then 
forms the basis of liberal divisions of a population. The liberal conception of 
government as arising from knowledges of civil society ‘feeds the authoritarian 
dimension of liberal government’: 
liberal government encompasses both the constitutionally defined legal-
political order and a liberal police established by a knowledge of spheres, 
processes and agencies outside this domain, eg. civil society, economy, 
population, etc..  In order to understand the authoritarian potential of liberal 
government we need to comprehend both aspects of the liberal order.27      
    
DISCOURSES OF SOVEREIGNTY AND DISCOURSES OF WAR 
                                                 
25
 B. Hindess, ‘Liberalism, socialism and democracy: variations on a governmental theme’ in A. Barry, 
T. Osborne and N.Rose eds Foucault and Political Reason. Liberalism, neo-liberalism and rationalities 
of government (1996), p.66. 
26
 M. Dean, ‘Liberal government and authoritarianism’, op. cit. (2002). 
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 id., p. 57. See also M. Dean, Governing Societies: Political perspectives on domestic and 
international rule, (2007) 
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A glimpse of the relations of Indigenous peoples in their accommodation and 
resistance to the early settlers of New South Wales provides one standpoint on the 
exercise of power.  In her account of attempts to impose sovereignty on the territory 
in the earliest period of occupation by British authorities, Lisa Ford documents how 
colonial authorities used diplomacy as the basis of state-indigenous relations, but 
when negotiation and conciliation failed ‘…the colony made war’. In the period 1790-
1816, military campaigns sent out to kill or capture Aborigines contained no 
declaration of martial law, as this would have assumed an assertion of sovereign 
authority over subjects or citizens.28 In 1805 Judge Advocate Atkins suggested that 
though Aborigines were ‘within the Pale of H.M. Protection’ they could not be legally 
tried because they were ‘totally ignorant’ of the ‘meaning and tendency’ of British 
legal proceedings. He advised the governor to meet Aboriginal depredations with 
decentralised violence ‘through the formation and deployment of local militia’, while 
settlers were excused in law of charges of murder for shooting Aborigines who stole 
their corn.29  Ford argues:  
…if imperial protection of Aborigines in New South Wales did not equate to 
jurisdiction over them, retaliation might be a legitimate response to 
Aboriginal violence under European principles of natural law … the 
government of New South Wales did not equate settler sovereignty with 
territorial jurisdiction. Indigenous people marked the juridical boundaries of 
the colony.30  
Instances of legal pluralism included an Aboriginal highwayman who in 1815 was 
incarcerated for two weeks to induce him to return the money he stole, without any 
intervention by a court.  The following year, Macquarie asked outlaw Aborigines to 
surrender so they could be ‘forgiven and pardoned’, an offer that Ford described as a 
‘jumble of diplomacy and jurisdiction’ but also a recognition that Aborigines ‘had yet 
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 L. Ford, Settler Sovereignty:  Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America and Australia, 1788-
1836, (2010) 45 
29
 id., p.47 
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 id., p.47. Ford observes that ‘protection’ was a vague term used to describe the status of foreigners 
residing in Britain or the status of a weak sovereign under the thrall of a stronger one.  ‘Neither status 
necessarily implied the loss of individual liberties or of corporate sovereignty’.  
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to submit themselves to His Majesty’s protection (and) had some corporate or 
individual choice in the matter’. 31  
 
      At this time, in both Australasia and North America, settler administrators and 
judges began to understand indigenous jurisdiction as a threat to settler sovereignty. 
Governor Macquarie’s 1816 Proclamation stated that armed individuals or groups of 
Aborigines appearing near towns would be considered ‘enemies’ of the colony and 
would be treated accordingly. Macquarie asserted that Aboriginal jurisdiction could 
be geographically (not juridically) displaced by a new special category – the Public 
Peace – and that barbarous Aboriginal customs might be displaced by British law. On 
these terms Aborigines could not bring arms near farms or congregate in family 
groups, without risking summary execution. Indigenous violence near farms was 
clearly regarded as an act of war. According to Ford, Macquarie’s argument invoked 
a particular liberal (but nevertheless, by 1816, anomalous) iteration of the ancient 
laws of conquest, whereby local law subsisted until displaced by the King, although 
British conquest would automatically invalidate any local customary laws that were 
‘barbarous’ or against natural law. Much of this position was enunciated in the form 
of opinion of the Chief Justice and others sitting, requested by legal officers such as 
the Attorney General, and in many cases the opinion was acknowledged as such, in 
many instances referred to as an expression of ‘mere principle’.32   
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 See for example R.v Ballard 23 April 1823. ‘The Chief Justice observed, that, sitting alone, he should 
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Decisions of the Superior Courts of New South Wales 1788-1791 at  
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    By the end of the 18th century, Ford suggests, Enlightenment philosophy had 
created a new ideological universe in which Aborigines were a people ‘so savage that 
they were unable to claim property or to constitute political society’.33 Throughout 
the 19th century, narratives of peril and ‘fear of one’s life’ continued to have salience 
as a justifiable homicide defence in settler killings of Aborigines in the more distant 
Australian peripheries, when the colony could not or would not exercise jurisdiction 
over Indigenous peoples. The settlers had a monopoly on legal evidence, as legal 
practice privileged the words of ‘respectable men’ and relegated Aboriginal 
testimony to rumour.34 At the end of that century, ‘race science’ constituted yet 
another ideological universe to buttress policies of separation and exclusion of 
Aboriginal populations, the effects of which are still being experienced.  
 
    So until 1836 in New South Wales, and after the settlement of Port Phillip District 
in 1838, law was used both as a method of Aboriginal civilization and an instrument 
of terror, but, as Ford observes, the gradual establishment of settler jurisdiction did 
not displace either Aboriginal customary law nor frontier settler violence.  In 1836, 
the complicated jurisdictional story around the case of R v Murrell, and particularly 
the decision of the jurist William Burton, finally determined the common-law status 
of Indigenous jurisdiction and sovereignty.  Aborigines were entitled to be regarded 
as a ‘free and independent people’, but the various tribes had not attained ‘to such a 
position in point of numbers and civilization…as to be entitled to be recognised as so 
many sovereign states governed by laws of their own’, which Ford describes as ‘a 
mix of Enlightenment stadial logic with law’.35  Using Vattel as his main source, 
Burton argued that Aborigines had no property or dominion in land because, as 
savages and barbarians, they had not appropriated it to themselves through 
cultivation. He assumed also that Aborigines were protected by the British sovereign 
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as individuals, not as corporate groups, and as such, under the law of nations, they 
fell within the jurisdiction of colonial courts and governance.  
 
    Paul Muldoon argues that if one views the Murrell case from the perspective of 
war, it is possible to see the extent to which the unity proclaimed through the 
discourse of sovereignty was in fact the victory of one ‘race’ over another.36 Rather 
than the problem of justice in the post-colonial state lying with issues around custom 
and giving it proper recognition through a system of law, as some critics have 
argued, Muldoon’s focus instead is on the discourse of sovereignty itself and the 
question of the so-called universality of sovereignty as a system of rule. The real 
problem is not so much that the ‘barbarians’ have not been recognised as 
‘sovereigns’ but rather that sovereignty, conceived as a specific territorial system of 
rule, continues to be the measure of politics. Hence, Muldoon seeks to displace the 
‘discourse of sovereignty’ in favour of a ‘discourse of war’ as the main grid of 
intelligibility in understanding relations of power in colonial Australia and its 
aftermath. Sovereignty functions as a stratagem by which one ‘race’ achieves 
domination over another. It is in this sense that the institutionalisation of British 
sovereignty does not so much represent the beginning of the reign of law, but rather 
a ‘partisan victory’ – a victory of a modern western conception of politics over 
another system of governance that did not rely on the figure of the sovereign or the 
principal of territoriality.37 So R v Murrell is treated by Muldoon as a sign of an 
historical conflict over law – a conflict in which sovereignty emerges as one of the 
tools to subjugate Indigenous inhabitants. Indeed, the Murrell case re-enacted the 
foundation myth of political community: 
By turning New Holland into a political nothingness and then filling it with 
law, Burton completed the Hobbesian metamorphosis in which the sovereign 
reclaims the state of nature for ‘society’.  Not only did this deny the act of 
conquest that was underway, it robbed the Aborigines of both the justice and 
intelligibility of the war they waged against it.  After Murrell, their resistance 
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to settlement had no other language in which to speak than that of 
criminality.38 
 
    The instructions given to Captain Cook in 1770 were to cultivate good relations 
with the inhabitants and to take possession ‘with the Consent of the Natives’. But 
consent was clearly not attempted. The British failure to negotiate is often attributed 
to the legal doctrine of ‘terra nullius’ but, as Kercher has shown, this doctrine was 
applied long after the initial occupation.39  Buchan points instead to British efforts to 
represent the Indigenous inhabitants as lacking an effective form of government by 
drawing on particular aspects of European thought around concepts of property, 
society and government.40  In seeking to determine whether Aborigines were 
‘uncivilised’ or ‘savage’ and hence lacking effective forms of government, the British 
‘were not simply aiming at factual description, but were engaged in the linguistic and 
conceptual representation of these peoples as subjects who could legitimately be 
dispossessed 
…by representing the Indigenous inhabitants of Australia as lacking effective 
government, the British did not simply mistakenly or perfidiously fail to 
acknowledge pre-existing Indigenous forms of government.  Rather, the very 
structure of their thought, and the language used to articulate it, led them to 
deny the possibility (at an official level) that Indigenous people could indeed 
possess their own legitimate forms of government.41 
Other more political concepts of a nation as a self-governing community were 
available to the British, but were rejected.  In 1841 Justice Willis attempted to adopt 
the concept as it was applied in the United States, but this was opposed by 
authorities in Sydney.  Further, in R v Murrell (1836), defence counsel argued that 
Aborigines had ‘manners and customs of their own’ – ‘in point of strictness and 
analogy to our law, we were bound to obey their laws not they obey ours’.42 But 
notions of a more advanced, superior civilisation enabled the mainly British political 
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thinkers to portray Indigenous peoples, especially as a consequence of their 
‘primitive’ means of subsistence, as being in want of effective government, or indeed 
any government at all.43  
 
    By the early twentieth century the bare-life conditions of Aboriginal peoples were 
such that the Australian national and state governments took it upon themselves to 
attack Aboriginal communities as a matter of policy. Firstly, the newly-formed 
national government revoked the citizenship rights of Australian Aboriginal peoples. 
Secondly, the state welfare boards removed thousands of children from their 
parents and placed them in foster homes or institutions: 
The watershed cases of the 1830s…redefined settler sovereignty as a 
territorial measure of authority that left little or no space for indigenous 
rights to property, to sovereignty, or to jurisdiction. They re-crafted plural 
settler polities into modern nation-states whose legitimacy was predicated 
on the subordination of indigenous rights. The many acts of dissolution, 
oppression, and marginalisation that followed were all performances of 
sovereignty. State legislation displaced Aborigines from their country to 
missions – a systematic attempt to erase indigeneity through spatial, social, 
and legal domination.44 
 
    We may observe, in these manoeuvres of displacement, glimpses of a merging of 
sovereign and disciplinary forms of power that are made bare by the presence of the 
white overlord. We may also observe the category of race as central to a series of 
questions around the constitution of political power in the colonial period, but which 
are occluded as these questions begin to merge around disciplinary forms of power 
based around science, rationality and specialisation.45 ‘The people’ is replaced by 
questions of population and a series of questions about its wealth, health, 
distribution and its bio-technical existence, while its attachment to ‘race’ becomes 
submerged. The constitution of specifically liberal forms of governing moves beyond 
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the binary of ‘them and us’, ‘Europe and its Other’ to cluster around a more 
complicated sets of concerns about life based on ‘statistical probabilities and rational 
normative discourses’.46  Foucault’s notion of governmentality contains an 
elaboration of a ‘warlike relation’ that still is ‘rumbling away…beneath political 
power’.47     
 
COMBAT, STRATEGY, TACTIC, MANOEUVRE 
 
Almost forty years after the settlement of the Port Philip District, the missions had 
become sites of rigorous and systematic attempts to destroy families, economic 
independence and Aboriginal identity.  The missions produce evidence of resistance 
to sovereignty, which Muldoon suggests had no other language to speak other than 
that of criminality. The activities of the Aborigines Protection Board in the colony of 
Victoria, built around discipline and biopolitics, are framed in the language of law 
which derived from the various Victorian Aboriginal Protection Acts.48 That their 
actions are consistent with the conduct of war – combat, strategy, tactic and 
manoeuvre - are evidenced in the machinations of the Protection Board as it sought 
to implement a series of measures to close the missions and break up familial 
relationships. Moreover, these actions were willed rather than determined by 
contemporary ideological shaping, as is evidenced by the statements of political 
adversaries. Many contemporary observers understood claims to British sovereignty 
to be a fiction.    
 
    In Victoria during the mid- to late 19th century, the colonial government 
established missions to ‘protect’ the remaining survivors of the British occupation, 
which had reduced the original inhabitants from more than 15,000 in 1834 to below 
3,000 in 1851, and by the 1920s to about 500 people.49 The official statistics are 
premised on resolution of a range of definitional issues regarding Aboriginal identity, 
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especially the counting of Aboriginal children, since after the passing of Aboriginal 
Acts during the last half of the 19th century most children of mixed European and 
Indigenous parentage were not regarded as Aborigines.50  There were an estimated 
thirty cultural-language groups made up of hundreds of clans or land-owning groups 
comprised perhaps 60,000 people before the European arrival.51 Compared with 
other districts, the Victorian colonial experience was distinctive in that there were 
few convicts, the occupation was swift due to fewer geographical obstacles (such as 
the Blue Mountains west of Sydney), the abundance of rich grasslands for sheep 
grazing, and because the Whig liberal outlook in Britain at the time sought 
unprecedented steps to try to protect Aboriginal people from the murderous 
onslaught experienced in other parts of the country. At the time of settlement of the 
Port Phillip District the Whigs were in government in Britain and influenced by a 
pressure group of humanitarians and evangelicals, and the latter, known as the 
Clapham Sect, had pressured the Liberal Government to assist emancipation of 
African slaves in the British West Indies. The Sect then looked to indigenous peoples 
in the British Empire, establishing a select committee to call for better protection 
and attempt to ameliorate the effects of British colonialism on those peoples.52 
 
    The policies of protection after the mid-19th century were motivated in part by 
what was seen to be the inability of the authorities to safeguard Aboriginal people 
from settler violence and secure access to schooling and other services in the face of 
European resistance.  On the other hand, as Broome suggests, the motive may be to 
convince the British government to allow pastoral settlement to go ahead on the 
south-eastern coast. Sandor observed that a major objective of placing on 
reservations a population of tuberculotic and otherwise unhealthy Aborigines was to 
minimize the health risk to Europeans -  the Port Phillip Association had set down its 
aims for protection as ‘… the civilization of the native tribes…and pastoral pursuits’.53 
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Whatever the motives, at least three-quarters of the Aboriginal population in the 
Port Phillip district died during the period of ‘protectionism’.54  Broome claims the 
influence of so-called ‘humanitarians and evangelicals’ led to the only treaty ever 
offered to Aborigines in Australia, later retracted by the Colonial Office, and the 
establishment of the first protectorate legislation enacted by a colonial government, 
a unique Aboriginal administration and a network of Aboriginal reserves and 
missions.55       
 
    A central Board for the Protection of Aborigines was established in 1860, based on 
an earlier Protectorate formed in 1838, to act as guardian and protector of 
indigenous people in the colony.  From the 1860s a Royal Commission was appointed 
to investigate increasing rates of Aboriginal mortality as well as allegations of 
mismanagement at the mission stations.  A new Aborigines Protection Act 1886 gave 
the Board new powers to define Aboriginality, and those subsequently classified as 
‘half-caste’ were increasing in number and cost.56 Thus began a period of 
governance of Indigenous people, lasting until at least the 1970s, which Broome 
describes as culturally the most dangerous: the breaking up of families, removal 
from land, and denial of identity.57 The takeover of land and the spread of European 
settlement continued through the colony of Victoria; at the same time, rates of 
morbidity and mortality among Aborigines increased and the costs of maintaining 
                                                 
54
 S. Andrews, ‘Victoria’ in W.M. Murray (ed.) The Struggle for Dignity, 1963.  
55
 Broome, op. cit., p. xxvi. 
56
 Victoria.  The Aborigines Protection Act 1886.  An Act to amend an Act intituled (sic) An Act to 
provide of the Protection and Management of the Aboriginal Natives of Victoria, Victorian 
Government Gazette, 10 December 1886.  s.4.   
The following persons shall be deemed to be aborginals (sic) within the meaning of the Principal Act:-  
(1) Every aboriginal native of Victoria. 
(2) Every half-caste who habitually associating and living with an aboriginal within the meaning of 
this section has prior to the date of the coming into operation of this Act completed the thirty-
fourth year of his or her age 
(3) Every female half-caste who has prior to the date aforesaid been married to an aboriginal within 
the meaning of this section and is at the date aforesaid living with such aboriginal  
(4) Every infant unable to earn his or her own living, the child of an aboriginal within the meaning of 
this section, living with such aboriginal’ 
(5) Any half-caste other than is hereinbefore specified who for the time being holds a licence in 
writing from the Board under regulations to be made in that behalf to reside upon any place 
prescribed as a place where any aboriginal or any tribe of aboriginals may reside Victoria.  
Aborigines Protection Act 1886 s. 4 . 
57
 Broome, op. cit., pp. 185-206. 
 19 
mission stations rose. Public utterances of officials during this period reflected the 
racial thinking of the period, but as Broome shows, leaders such as Victorian Premier 
John Murray privately confessed to the ‘usurper’s anxieties about ownership’: 
though the white man may have a legal right to the land, we must not forget 
that, after all, in a higher court, the blackfellow would be able to establish a 
much stronger moral right to the land than any of our white friends who own 
them today.58 
However, in the absence of this ‘higher court’, the imagery of liberal government 
was to maximise the freedom of subjects and to govern through this freedom.  From 
this point of view, a function of the missions was to deny sovereignty in relation to 
Aboriginal peoples, or at the very least maintain an ambivalence by means of a 
‘Protectorate’, while at the same time establishing relations of force over 
populations considered only partly Aboriginal.  As an element of a genealogy of self-
determination,59 liberal governance thus set about defining and separating out a 
‘half-caste’ population and then obliging this population to be free to join the labour 
force and compete in the marketplace. This obligation to observe the discipline of 
the market was founded not on a discourse of sovereignty and law but rather 
political economy and the discourse of norms.  The code of normalization refers to a 
field of human sciences, which incorporated theories of race.60  Underpinned by the 
designation of some Aboriginal populations as ‘non-Aboriginal’, and achieved 
through the establishment and expansion of the system of mission stations and 
subsequent separations within it, the fate of Aborigines could appear as an 
expression of individuals’ actions in the world rather than an expression of race war. 
Resistance to these attacks on identity and culture similarly could appear as 
individual, isolated and non-political, if the latter refers to the ‘action of the norm’ 
rather than a response to political domination.   
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    The mundane management of Indigenous peoples in the missions provides 
glimpses of how resistance came to be translated according to liberal forms of 
governing.61  The Office of the Board for Protection of the Aborigines was located in 
the City Bank Chambers in Melbourne; in 1890 its Chairman was the Chief Secretary 
in the Victorian Government, and the members consisted of members of the 
Victorian parliament, educationists and an assortment of senior public servants. 
Albert Le Souef, for example, was Director of the Zoological Gardens, and Alexander 
Morrison was headmaster of Scotch College, a leading Melbourne private school. 
The Board exercised close and ongoing connections with each of the missions spread 
around the colony, and provided detailed advice and guidance on matters of staffing, 
funding, and rules over the movement of the inhabitants of the missions. The 
missions themselves were usually headed by a minister of religion, who reported to 
a General Inspector and Secretary. Schooling, religious services, and work on the 
mission were the daily routine, and a daily ‘roll call’ was conducted.  
 
    From the Act and its regulations, and in the records and correspondence of the 
Protection Board, it is clear that a number of strategies were put in place during the 
last decades of the 19th and the early 20th century to try to draw the different 
Aboriginal groups into a dependent, perhaps suppliant relationship with settler 
society. This was attempted through a range of strategies that problematised 
fundamental elements of life-politics - the constitution of Aboriginal identity, the 
control of bodies and spaces in which Aboriginal people would live and labour, and 
the placing into ‘darkness and silence’ the possibility of alternate powers to claim 
possession and occupation of the land.62  Regulations under the Act stipulated that 
Aborigines were required to live on the mission, and at the same time required to 
perform work to be permitted to draw rations: ‘…any Aboriginal, residing on a 
proscribed Station shall do some reasonable amount of work, and anyone refusing to 
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do so when required shall have his supplies stopped until he resumes work’.63  The 
Board instructed its managers and agents on the missions that Aborigines were 
required to ‘provide for their own wants’: ‘it is not intended that the Aborigines 
should derive their subsistence wholly from the liberality of the Government and, 
indeed, the sum voted for the supply of stores each year is inadequate to provide for 
their wants’.64 By the turn of the 20th century there were six missions spread across 
the colony. The Board tried unsuccessfully to close many of the missions and transfer 
‘Blacks’ (also called ‘full bloods’) to a single mission in a remote area of the state at 
Lake Tyers. The Act of 1886 reversed the definition of ‘Aboriginal’ so that those 
people who were seen as ‘part-Aboriginal’ were no longer Aboriginal under the 
terms of the Act. Regulations forbad half-caste people access to the mission stations 
and their families, which had the immediate effect of separating family groups, 
reducing the productiveness of the missions, and denying Aboriginal identity. The 
purpose was to ‘merge’ Aborigines with the white population. With the anticipated 
‘dying out’ of the ‘Blacks’, this tactic would remove the Aboriginal population – it 
would ‘simply be cleared out of the way’.65  
 
    Children were removed from their parents on the missions when they were old 
enough to work, and under the authority of the Protection Board were sent out to 
service following a period of training, or for adoption with non-Aboriginal families.  
From 1900, Aboriginal children removed from their families and the communities in 
the mission stations were passed over to the Department of Neglected Children and 
Reformatory Schools to be placed in an institution or sent out to ‘service’. Under this 
administration Aboriginal children were subject to provisions akin to a system of 
indeterminate sentencing that for many years had been applied to non-Indigenous 
offenders.  Older people were given three years to find work and accommodation 
and were then excluded from the missions and their families.66 The records of the 
Protection Board indicate that the first signs of ‘trouble’ and criminality with the 
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policy of removing children from the missions were the half-castes ‘hanging around 
the missions’ when they were supposed to be joining the workforce, and drawing on 
the rations of their full-blood relatives on the mission stations.   
I am sorry to say that there is a general tendency among the young people to be 
lazy, disobedient, and careless, which, if not stopped in due time, will become 
very troublesome to the Board and dangerous to the white population as well as 
for themselves.67 
The Board had reported the ongoing problem of the young half-caste men ‘ready to 
take advantage’ of anyone receiving rations.68  Under the Act, rations for half-castes 
were stopped immediately they reached the lawful age, but the Aborigines Board 
knew that they were drawing on the rations of their families living on the mission 
and that this was a disincentive to ‘moving them on’.  
We found that those who could not make their rations last were those [crossed 
out and replaced by the word] families who had friends and visitors.  Half caste 
people who have no business on the Station.  Only three pounds of meat has 
been given to these people per week as it was thought best they should to some 
extent rely on their own rations.69   
The Board’s records show that trouble-making is consistently depicted as activities 
which put at risk the Government’s aim of reducing the size of the missions, and that 
access to rations explained the failure of the scheme to move the half-castes off the 
mission.  It was the policies of removal, however, that underpinned a criminalizing of 
the ‘young half-caste’.  The Board wanted ‘our young half-caste people’ to persevere 
in making a living ‘… otherwise they would just return to the mission’.  Biopolitical 
interventions extended to concerns about Aboriginal men wanting to marry ‘girls of 
mixed blood’, who were forced to run away from the missions because such unions 
were not allowed for under the Act.  In such cases, the men ran away from the 
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mission and were ‘forced to immorality and take to their old way of inducing girls to 
go with them and thus they live together without being married at all’.70  
 
    In the correspondence between the Board and the managers of the missions and 
their supervisors, the issues of ‘blood’ and ‘colour’ presented a continuing concern 
for administrators.  They reported on constant attempts by Aborigines to challenge 
the regulation that deemed ‘full-bloods’ the only legitimate recipients of rations.  It 
was also made clear that children from other colonies were being supported by the 
Board by moving onto missions and drawing rations. The ‘trouble-making’ involved 
in wilful sharing of resources demonstrates a racialised disparity with the white 
lawbreakers.  Compared with the European policies of building support for the 
norms of family life, Aboriginal getting-together with family and sharing resources 
was instead criminalized by those administering the Act.  Resistance to the official 
definition of ‘Aboriginal’ was itself an offence.71 So the racialised disparity of 
criminalizing Aboriginal people who were found to be breaking the provisions of the 
Act, by attempting to draw rations and support from their families on the mission, 
was accompanied by another provision that allowed those same children who had 
been separated from their parents and sent into foster care or into service to be 
institutionalized for an indefinite period, without any appearance before a court.  
Disparities also appeared in the judgment about who should and who should not be 
entitled to reside on the mission.  Again, these were administrative decisions 
underpinned by changes to legislation in the 1890 Act making it an offence to 
‘harbor any aborigine … unless such aborigine shall from illness or from the result of 
accident or other cause be in urgent need of succour’.72 It is in these terms that we 
can begin to interpret Muldoon’s claim that Aboriginal resistance to settlement 
‘…had no other language in which to speak than that of criminality’.73  Throughout 
this period, systems of security underpinned by law (in the case of the Northern 
Territory, the ‘legal’ segregation of persons defined as Aborigines beginning with the 
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Northern Territories Aborigines Act 1910) established a juridical combination of law 
and regulation that gave protection officers direct powers over basic life 
circumstances, in particular, control over miscegenation. 74     
 
    Scientific views of the superiority and inferiority of races had become prominent 
among some Europeans as a rationale for the ‘clearing away’ of those referred to as 
the ‘full bloods’. Once again, the translation of race science requires a local, practical 
engagement with the particular circumstances of the Australian colonial setting.75 
What came to be taken as a given in science shifted in the 19th century to 
accommodate a range of different perspectives on the origins of Australian 
Aborigines and their likely destiny. There is evidence that environmentalism 
influenced early 19th century ethnographers’ views on the condition of Aboriginal 
people, indicating that their supposed lack of sophistication and civilization was due 
to the inadequacies of their environment, while towards the end of the century the 
view that Aborigines were different in their ‘natural’ capacities and were remnants 
of an about-to-be extinct race became more prominent.76  But throughout the 19th 
century the focus of scientific attention was on the origins and significance of racial 
differences in Indigenous people as these might affect the future of the white race in 
the new settlement in Australia. In the lead-up to World War 1, many scientists were 
convinced that Aborigines were the remnants of an earlier Caucasian invasion which 
had either eliminated or absorbed the first inhabitants and hence provided the 
groundwork on which to speculate about the white race in the antipodes.  Anderson 
observes that the doctors who were drawn to Aboriginal studies seemed to be more 
interested in discerning racial types and tracing human genealogies than recording 
the ‘pathophysiological mechanism’ that led to Aboriginal demise on contact with 
the white invader.77 But many did not countenance the continued deterioration of 
the Aboriginal population. Scientific enquiry may have accepted that culture derived 
from inherited racial capacities rather than historical circumstances, and that ‘race 
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struggle’ shaped history.  But many were also alert to the Lamarckian dynamic 
evidenced in Aboriginal peoples’ rapid adaptation to local needs. Rarely were early 
Australian doctors driven to an uncompromising hereditary view of the Aboriginal 
condition, and most supported and argued for the view that ‘a change in 
environment would change the race’.78 
     
    Nevertheless, contemporary observers were appalled at the effects of European 
settlement on Aboriginal health.  A non-medical visitor to the Lake Tyers settlement 
in 1918 was able to observe the emaciated condition of the people and how the sea-
air and winter conditions was obviously having serious effects on  children suffering 
from tuberculosis.79  There was an international scandal about Australia’s policies of 
Aboriginal child removal in the 1920s and 30s when mission educator and activist 
Mary Bennett, in her 1933 paper to the Dominion Women’s British Commonwealth 
League in London, denounced the removal of Aboriginal women and girls as ‘akin to 
slavery’ and as contravening the League of Nations Covenant and Slavery 
Convention.80   
 
    In the following decades, government sought to construct rationalities of rule that 
developed from ideas of assimilation, and then self-government, in contexts of 
continuing dissent. For example, the period between 1967, when constitutional 
amendment allowed Indigenous people to be counted as citizens and new policies 
advocated self-determination, and 1996, coinciding with the election of a 
conservative coalition government, is regarded as a discursive break in the history of 
Indigenous affairs.  Language changed, new entities and categories were brought 
into being.  But as Howard Wagner observes, the language of self-determination and 
autonomy was largely a ‘federal-government construct’ which in effect allowed any 
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tentative moves towards Indigenous self-government to be declared later as simply 
a failure.81  These moves helped to provide the political conditions for attempts to 
return agency for the circumstances of their existence back upon Aboriginal peoples 
themselves.  
    
AUTHORITARIAN LIBERALISM / ‘RACE’ WAR 
Decades later, a group called Concerned Australians submitted a report on the 
Northern Territory Emergence Response to the United Nations Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, arguing that some of the worst human rights 
violations in the Western world were taking place in the Northern Territory.82  In 
keeping with the post-9/11 descriptions and analyses of extraordinary governmental 
interventions in which ‘normal law’ is apparently suspended, such as the US 
establishment of a prison at Guantanamo Bay, the NT intervention as been described 
in the language of ‘special measures’ and ‘martial law’, a mission to ‘stabilize’, 
‘normalize’ and ‘exit’.83 The Australian Prime Minister spoke of ‘the national 
emergency’ as Australia’s version of Hurricane Katrina.84  The intervention was 
‘operationalized’ under military command and used the language of strategy and 
tactics to describe its activities. The majority of the measures in fact required new 
Commonwealth Government legislation to proceed.85 The Social Security and Other 
Legislation Amendment (Welfare Payments Reform) Act 2007 mandated that 50 
percent of income support and family assistance payments to Indigenous people 
living in remote parts of the Northern Territory be managed by the government. The 
funds could only be used for items considered essential by the government, such as 
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food, clothes, rent, electricity, medicine and basic household goods. Not only did this 
law underpin the government’s activities in the NT, it was then extended throughout 
non-Indigenous welfare recipients across Australia, in order to satisfy requirements 
for revising the Racial Discrimination Act (1975), which prohibits legislation 
discriminating against groups on the basis of race.  Income quarantining for welfare 
recipients was initiated under so-called emergency circumstances and its 
‘exceptionality’ as a legal provision under social security legislation became a legal 
‘norm’. It is in this sense that the ‘exceptional decision’ came to affirm law’s 
normality – ‘that the exception to the law is itself of the law and that the exception’s 
attendant sovereign rule is constituted by law’.86 
    
    Three weeks after the announcement of the emergency response, the affected NT 
Indigenous organisations asked for a two-staged plan to address problems of child 
abuse in remote Aboriginal communities, including an emergency response agreed 
quickly between Governments and community leaders, and a more comprehensive 
plan and costed financial commitment for more resources for communities, police, 
child protection and health services, tougher restrictions on sale of alcohol, 
community based family support, improved access to mediation, treatment and 
rehabilitation services, and better access to primary health care and education 
services. 87 Aboriginal community organisations commented on issues of the safety 
of children and families in the following terms: 
Effective child abuse prevention and child protection occurs where local 
community agencies, police and child protection staff work in a collaborative 
and coordinated manner…The emergency measures announced by the 
Australian Government lack insight into effective child protection 
interventions and in effect seek to strengthen only one partner in the three 
way partnership – the Northern Territory police. Whilst the allocation of 
increased police resources for Aboriginal communities is a priority, other key 
elements of the child protection system also require immediate additional 
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resources. Only by providing additional resources for police, local Aboriginal 
agencies and statutory child protection staff to all play their part in child 
protection interventions will we see a significant improvement in how abuse 
is reported and dealt with.88   
This advice was echoed in the Australian Human Rights Commission Report on the 
intervention,89 and by the Wild and Anderson report itself.90 AHRC reiterated that 
Wild and Anderson had recommended ‘…a radical change in the way government 
and non-government organisations consult, engage with and support Aboriginal 
people’. Wild and Anderson stated  
…it was a common theme of discussions that many Aboriginal people felt 
disempowered, confused, overwhelmed, and disillusioned with this situation 
leading to communities being weakened to the point that the likelihood of 
children being sexually abused is increased and the community ability to deal 
with it is decreased.91     
On the question of law, however, evidence forwarded to the UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination shows that the consultation and consent 
required before a ‘special measure’ is introduced did not take place. This means that 
the legislation introducing the special measure appeared to be ‘inconsistent with the 
Racial Discrimination Act’.92     
 
    On 20th October 2010, Gurindji workers and residents from the remote Aboriginal 
communities of Kalkaringi and Dagaragu stopped work in protest against the 
intervention.  Gurindji leaders say that the closure of the Community Development 
Employment Projects (CDEP), local government reforms and the seizure of land and 
assets under the intervention have had a devastating impact on the community. The 
Labor government promised to phase out remaining CDEP programs and transition 
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Aboriginal workers into ‘real jobs’, but instead hundreds have been forced onto 
income management and local services are struggling or have collapsed. Dagaragu is 
the site of the original Wave Hill walk-off, where Gurindji stockman went on strike 
against Vesty’s station to fight for equal wages and the return of traditional 
homelands. The Gurindji people have a proud history of standing up for Aboriginal 
rights. They say that since the intervention these hard won rights have been stripped 
away. Protest spokesperson John Leemans said the community is sick of being 
bullied by the government and wants control of local employment, housing 
programs and Aboriginal Land handed back to the community: 
Prior to the Intervention we had nearly 300 CDEP workers employed in 
municipal services, construction and maintenance roles. When the 
government took over and abolished the community council and CDEP 
everything came to a halt. We went two years without regular rubbish 
collection because the truck was seized. Houses and buildings are in 
desperate need of repair but there’s no funding for workers or materials. If 
you go out to Dagaragu you’ll see the evidence these cuts have had on our 
people. Everything we built has gone - the old CDEP office, the brick making 
shed, the nursery, the health clinic, the old family centre. Soon we may lose 
the bakery. Houses that are now under Territory Housing control are 
overcrowded and falling apart. The damage is just overwhelming. We now we 
have around 40 workers left on CDEP and training programs. Many are 
working 35 hour weeks but under the new laws they’re working for nothing 
but a Centrelink payment. It’s worse than working for the dole, because half 
goes onto the BasicCard and can only be spent at approved stores. History is 
being repeated here, with our people forced to work for rations again.93  
 
    In October 2010, representatives from trade unions and residents of neighbouring 
communities joined with the Gurindji people. Many Gurindji also travelled to Alice 
Springs to join national rallies calling for ‘Jobs with Justice’ for Aboriginal workers 
and an end to the intervention. These protests were supported by numerous 
                                                 
93
 J. Leemans (2010) Gurindji strike against Government Intervention: “History is being repeated 
here”.   Media Release 18 October 2010. 
 30 
organisation including Unions NT, the CFMEU, Tangentyere Council and the National 
Association of Community Legal Centres. ‘The government has got to listen to the 
Australian people, the churches, the unions, the UN. Everybody around the world is 
condemning this intervention and the government can’t ignore the world. They have 
to demolish this law’.94  In May 2011, Rev. Dr. Djiniyini Gondarra OAM, a senior elder 
and Dhurili Clan leader of the Yolngu peoples of Northeast Arnhem Land, met 
privately with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay.  At the top of 
their agenda was the still ongoing intervention, which had been heavily criticized by 
the United Nations Committee on the Convention to Eliminate Racial Discrimination, 
the UN Human Rights Committee and the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
Rights.  At the time of writing, the High Commissioner is due to again visit Australia 
to examine the current human rights record of the Australian Government. 
 
    A recent discussion of the ‘exceptionality’ of Northern Territory Emergency 
Response drew attention  to the sexuality and ‘pleasure’ elements of the 
intervention – the ways in which violence, pleasure, and sovereign power intersect 
to discursively  produce a punitive response and an ‘intensively moralising’ public 
discourse about Indigenous Australians.95 A ‘forth pillar’ of sovereignty was 
proposed:  a pleasure derived from the freedom to define the pleasure of ‘others’ – 
that is, a pleasure is accrued from the freedom to do violence to ‘others’. For its part, 
law becomes an expression of a perpetual form of victory that guarantees a 
continuing free hand for the victors. Tedmanson and Wadiwel argue that the NT 
intervention created ‘racialized zones of exception’ controlling the purchase and use 
of items – for example, tobacco, alcohol, pornography – that would not be tolerated 
or even arguable if proposed for any other Australian communities. The rationalities 
of rule at work here had new materials and contexts through which to mount 
programs of disciplinary biopolitics, but they belong to broadly the same genre as 
the missions; in their focus on governing space and territoriality, they are also 
consistent with the legal and non-legal mechanisms at play in the foundational 
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removal of Indigenous jurisdiction and sovereignty – they were, in other words, 
‘unexceptional’ as liberal techniques of governing. On the freedoms under liberal 
political reason, an exercise of the free hand of the victor is by no means connected 
to equality.  On the contrary, as these authors argue, it conveys the opposite sense. 
Citing Foucault: 
Freedom is the ability to deprive others of their freedom – essentially the 
freedom of egoism, of greed – a taste for battle, conquest and plunder…the 
freedom of these warriors is not the freedom of tolerance and equality for 
all; it is the freedom that can be exercised only through domination.96  
 
    The recommendations provided to government in the Little Children are Sacred 
Report stressed the fundamental importance of consultations with Indigenous 
communities before any action was taken on its findings.  Instead, the NT 
intervention continued the tactics of government that have characterized the 
management of ‘Aboriginal Affairs’ since colonization. According to the Aboriginal 
Medical Service Cooperative, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 
had campaigned since the early 1990s for funding to implement child abuse 
prevention strategies. ATSIC was subsequently closed down, with a previous Minister 
for Indigenous Affairs in 2007 describing it as a ‘fraud’.97 An example of good 
governance often provided by Indigenous organisations was the National Aboriginal 
Health Strategy in 1989, which although the policy remains unimplemented, was 
described as ‘the first occasion in Australian history since 1788 that Aboriginal 
peoples and Australian governments had worked together under the Aboriginal 
decision making process of consensus’.98 
 
CONCLUSION 
The NT intervention is an overwhelmingly punitive response to a report which in fact 
highlighted the need for a series of ordered social policy responses that had been 
sought by Aboriginal communities for decades, and to economic and community 
                                                 
96
 Foucault [1976] 2003, 157, 148, cited in Tedmanson and Wadiwel, op. cit., p. 13. 
97National Indigenous Times( 2007).  
98
 Aboriginal Medical Service Cooperative Ltd, Correspondence (2007) 
 32 
disintegration wrought by the appropriation of land and the imposition of an 
invaders’ law and culture. The criminalising of Indigenous Australians is linked to 
assemblages of power located in the partisan victories around sovereignty and 
interpretations of Aboriginal resistance to rule;99  the administrative knowledges 
around concepts of family abuse that interpret economic and social dislocation as 
intentioned perpetrations of child abuse and deviance;100 and the freedom of the 
victor to perpetually subjugate through the normalising power of legal mechanisms 
that seek to control of sex, sexuality and reproduction.101 The NT intervention 
displays a further element observed by Muldoon – more general criminalising of the 
population by means of its exclusion from the social sphere: the blue bill-boards 
announcing the alcohol restrictions, the intense power through the shaming of the 
people: 
…so as far as we’re concerned, its too much exertion brought to bear on 
naughty children. We are not naughty children. We are very deep thinking 
people and we utilize our law of the land to assist us to where we want to 
get. The biggest thing that we have an argument with the government is, 
we’re not white people. We have our own language. We have our own 
ceremonies. We have our own land. What we want from government is real 
help and real funding rather than putting law on top of our Law102 
 
    The significance of these events was to turn the history of the raw violent 
colonizing of Aboriginal people living in the outback, detailed in countless appeals for 
resources to stem the economic and social disintegration, into a story of the collapse 
and failure of Aboriginal culture and way of life. Such disintegration was now so 
dramatic, so hopeless and helpless, that the people had supposedly turned to 
violence on their families and children, a performance played out on news services 
across Australia in ways which could only be met with revulsion and outrage. Such 
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strategic preparations make the eventual police and military strike a highly 
predictable event, and in historical terms, anything but exceptional.  
 
